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We describe the enhanced rumor surveillance during
the avian influenza H5N1 outbreak in 2004. The World
Health Organization’s Western Pacific Regional Office
identified 40 rumors; 9 were verified to be true. Rumor sur-
veillance informed immediate public health action and pre-
vented unnecessary and costly responses. 
I
n January 2004, 14 persons in Vietnam were admitted to
provincial hospitals with severe respiratory illness (1).
Avian influenza H5N1 was detected in samples from 3 of
these patients. Health officials and the World Health
Organization (WHO) were concerned, as these were spo-
radic cases of an influenza strain that normally infects
birds exclusively (2). Furthermore, little was known about
the extent of the outbreak, its potential for international
spread, and the possible evolution of a pandemic influenza
strain. WHO issued an international public health alert on
January 13, 2004, to inform the world about the outbreak
(1). 
News of the outbreak led to international anxiety and
the propagation of unofficial outbreak reports or disease
rumors (3). These rumors could have led countries to
impose trade and travel restrictions with negative social,
economic, and health consequences (3,4). To protect both
the international community and the affected countries,
WHO introduced enhanced rumor surveillance for reports
of avian influenza H5N1, a process of investigating unof-
ficial reports of disease events to determine their veracity.
Rumor surveillance aims to decrease the potential for mis-
information and misunderstanding and to inform the pub-
lic and health officials about disease outbreaks, facilitate a
rapid response, and promote public health preparedness
(3). 
Rumor surveillance is a passive process, where rumors
are identified from media reports, professional groups, the
public, and persons in the WHO network, which is made
up of WHO headquarters, country offices, and WHO
Collaborating Centers. In an enhanced system, rumor sur-
veillance is intensified by actively seeking out rumors and
undertaking more rigorous follow up. This surveillance
includes analyzing more media sources and regularly
requesting information from the WHO network about out-
break events. Previous studies have examined the role of
enhanced rumor surveillance during public health emer-
gencies, such as the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986
and the outbreak of Ebola in Uganda in 2000 (5,6).
However, research has not examined the role of rumor sur-
veillance in multicountry or regional outbreaks.
The importance of rumor surveillance is likely to
increase as the international community considers the
revised draft of the International Health Regulations
(IHR). Article 8 of the IHR Working Paper (7) states,
“WHO, in consultation with the health administration of
the State concerned, shall verify rumors of public health
risks which may involve or result in international spread of
disease.” 
During the avian influenza outbreak, WHO’s Western
Pacific Regional Office (WPRO) was the focal point for
identifying rumors and coordinating their investigations in
the region (8). WPRO covers 37 nations and stretches from
China in the north and west, to New Zealand in the south,
and to French Polynesia in the east (9). This study exam-
ines whether the enhanced rumor surveillance undertaken
by WPRO during the first 40 days of the outbreak achieved
its aims of: 1) offering timely assistance to potentially
affected nations, 2) prompting countries to undertake pre-
paredness measures appropriate to their level of risk of
being affected, and 3) informing the public and the inter-
national community about relevant events. 
The Study
WPRO designated a rumor surveillance officer to
develop and implement the rumor surveillance system for
avian influenza in animals and humans. This officer active-
ly assessed media sources and email-based public health
discussion and regularly contacted the WHO network to
identify rumors. Media sources included journalists visit-
ing WPRO and Web sites for television networks and
newspapers. Most were English-based media sources;
however, some were also in Japanese and Arabic. To
increase the scope of the active media search, this officer
also accessed the Global Public Health Intelligence
Network (10), an electronic surveillance system that con-
tinuously monitors >600 media sources and biomedical
journals in a number of languages, including Chinese,
Spanish, English, and French. 
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request to the relevant WHO country office to investigate
its veracity. The WHO country office in turn sought verifi-
cation from the country’s health authorities. Overall, the
onus of the verification process was in the hands of the
affected countries’ health authorities. The authorities had
to demonstrate to WHO that appropriate investigations
were conducted to deem rumors correct or incorrect. To
ensure this process, WHO sometimes supported rumor
verification by assisting in laboratory testing or shipment
of isolates.
Once available, the outcome of the investigation was
disseminated to WHO stakeholders, including the outbreak
response team. For events reported in the media, WPRO’s
media officers made information publicly available
through press releases and media interviews, as well as
providing up-to-date information on the WHO Web site
(http://www.who.int). 
From January 20 to February 26, 2004, a total of 40
rumors were identified, most within 4 weeks of the out-
break alert (Figure). The rumors concerned 12 countries
and 1 special administrative region. Of the total rumors
received, 19 (48%) were received from the media, 18
(45%) from the WHO network, 2 (5%) from embassy staff
living in affected countries, and 1 (2%) from ProMED
Digest with a media source as the origin. Nine (23%)
rumors were confirmed to be true events: 5 in China and 1
each in Cambodia, Japan, Laos, and South Korea. Of the
incorrect rumors, 6 were in China, 6 in Laos, 4 in Vietnam,
4 in Hong Kong, 3 in Cambodia, 2 in Germany, and 1 each
in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia,
and Singapore. 
The average period for verification of true events was
2.7 days (range 1–5 days). The average period to verify
that a rumor was incorrect was 9.3 days (range 1–26 days).
Sixty percent of the rumors related to human outbreaks, of
which 1 was true, and 40% to animal outbreaks, of which
8 were true. The Table provides examples of rumors
received during the 40-day study, the outcomes of the
investigation, and the public health action taken. (An
expanded version of this table is available online from
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/04-0657.htm#table.) The
remaining 32 rumors are not shown for reasons of brevity
and privacy; however, not all rumors resulted in public
health action after the verification process. This finding
was expected because the high sensitivity of the system
decreased the predictive value positive. 
Conclusions
WPRO’s enhanced rumor surveillance system identi-
fied many rumors. Most were identified in the first few
weeks after the public health alert. A similar pattern was
also observed during the 2003 SARS outbreak, when most
rumors were received within the first 7 weeks of the pub-
lic health alert (11). The decreased rate of rumor detection
later in the outbreak is consistent with Allport and
Postman’s basic law of rumor (12). According to this law,
the amount of rumors in circulation is roughly equal to the
importance of the rumor multiplied by the uncertainty sur-
rounding the rumor. We found that, as more information
became available about the outbreaks and about the H5N1
virus, fewer rumors circulated. This decrease was despite
the fact that the importance of the disease remained high
because of the ongoing risk for evolution of a pandemic
influenza strain.
Through rumor surveillance, WHO assisted affected
countries by issuing guidelines, providing technical
expertise, and mobilizing supplies. Unaffected countries
also took action by banning the importation of poultry
from affected countries. This action was crucial in prevent-
ing the further spread of avian influenza.
An important part of rumor surveillance is the timely
dissemination of accurate information to reduce misunder-
standing and unwarranted concern, especially for rumors
reported in the media. One example was the need to
address the international concern that arose about the
rumor that pigs were infected with avian influenza (13). If
the rumor had not been reported to be incorrect publicly
after the verification process, health authorities may have
heightened avian influenza surveillance to include the
investigation of persons with symptoms of influenza and a
history of contact with pigs. 
The literature lacks guidance on how to establish and
operate enhanced rumor surveillance during large out-
breaks. Based on our experience and drawing on the rec-
ommendations in standard texts on public health
surveillance (14,15), we suggest the following criteria for
developing rumor surveillance: 1) Define the goals of sur-
veillance as part of an early warning system in which each
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Figure. Number of rumors received from January 20 to February
26 by source of rumor, Western Pacific Regional Office (WPRO) of
the World Health Organization (WHO), 2004. rumor deserves investigation to determine its veracity; 2)
Apply a case definition that will have a high level of sen-
sitivity (and therefore a relatively lower specificity) to
identify the event of interest early in the outbreak; 3)
Articulate clearly the steps to be undertaken to assess the
veracity of the rumor, the criteria for deeming the verifica-
tion process complete, and the ethics and confidentiality in
conducting investigations; 4) Clarify the actions to be
taken if the rumored events are true, or incorrect, or if the
response of the verifying authority lacks credibility; 5)
Delegate responsibility for data collection, management of
the rumor database, and verification to a person trained in
surveillance. This person must have access to relevant
national and international networks and appropriate nego-
tiation skills to investigate the veracity of the rumors. In
selected instances, multilingual staff may be essential; 6)
Include among the data sources print and electronic media,
the Global Public Health Intelligence Network, national
health authorities, and professional bodies and networks.
Consider mechanisms for the public to report rumors
through a hotline or an email address; 7) Develop mecha-
nisms to provide regular updates on current verification
activities, the number of rumors investigated, and their
outcomes to the outbreak response team; 8) Provide regu-
lar feedback on the outcomes of investigations to those
who provided data, and where appropriate, to the interna-
tional community; and 9) Evaluate the efficiency and
effectiveness of the investigations and upgrade the rumor
surveillance system through a process of continuous qual-
ity improvement. 
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